Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Paperback)


Indo-Pakistani relations are shadowed by the issue of nuclear weapons and the specter that nuclear-capable missiles may soon be deployed. In this book, author Neil Joeck argues that basic nuclear capabilities have in fact not created strategic stability. Such capabilities, he argues, neither explain the absence of war over the past decade nor why war is currently unlikely. While limited nuclear capabilities increase the costs of conflict, they do little to reduce the risk of its occurrence.
Maintaining Nuclear Stability asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability in a crisis and improve India's and Pakistan's ability to avoid nuclear use if war breaks out, and that diplomatic steps particularly focused on missiles must also be considered. With nuclear weapons in hand, the price of potential failed deterrence is catastrophically high. Investing more resources on a bet that nuclear capabilities ensure safety only raises the penalties if the initial decision was wrong. Joeck proposes that command and control and diplomatic engagement provide some insurance that, if that bet is called, nuclear use is not the only choice left.

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Product Description

Indo-Pakistani relations are shadowed by the issue of nuclear weapons and the specter that nuclear-capable missiles may soon be deployed. In this book, author Neil Joeck argues that basic nuclear capabilities have in fact not created strategic stability. Such capabilities, he argues, neither explain the absence of war over the past decade nor why war is currently unlikely. While limited nuclear capabilities increase the costs of conflict, they do little to reduce the risk of its occurrence.
Maintaining Nuclear Stability asserts that the development of command and control mechanisms would enhance stability in a crisis and improve India's and Pakistan's ability to avoid nuclear use if war breaks out, and that diplomatic steps particularly focused on missiles must also be considered. With nuclear weapons in hand, the price of potential failed deterrence is catastrophically high. Investing more resources on a bet that nuclear capabilities ensure safety only raises the penalties if the initial decision was wrong. Joeck proposes that command and control and diplomatic engagement provide some insurance that, if that bet is called, nuclear use is not the only choice left.

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Product Details

General

Imprint

Oxford UniversityPress

Country of origin

United States

Series

Adelphi series

Release date

February 2005

Availability

Expected to ship within 12 - 17 working days

First published

1997

Authors

Dimensions

234 x 156 x 4mm (L x W x T)

Format

Paperback

Pages

92

ISBN-13

978-0-19-829406-1

Barcode

9780198294061

Categories

LSN

0-19-829406-9



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